Linking emission trading to environmental innovation: Evidence from the Italian manufacturing industry by Borghesi, Simone et al.
RL
t
S
a
b
c
a
A
R
R
2
A
A
K
E
E
C
M
1
i
r
t
n
R
i
s
t
2
u
b
i
a
ﬁ
t
b
i
h
0ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelESPOL-3072; No. of Pages 15
Research Policy xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Research  Policy
jo ur nal ho me  page: www.elsev ier .com/ locate / respol
inking  emission  trading  to  environmental  innovation:  Evidence  from
he  Italian  manufacturing  industry
imone  Borghesia, Giulio  Cainelli b, Massimiliano  Mazzanti c,∗
University of Siena, Italy
University of Padova, Italy
University of Ferrara, Italy
 r  t  i  c  l  e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 29 June 2013
eceived in revised form
7 September 2014
ccepted 20 October 2014
vailable online xxx
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This  paper  examines  the  different  forces  underlying  the adoption  of  environmental  innovations  (EI),
with  a focus  on policy  related  EI.  In particular,  exploiting  the  2006–2008  wave  of the  Italian  Community
Innovation  Survey  (CIS),  we investigate  whether  the ﬁrst  phase  of the European  Emissions  Trading  Scheme
(EU  ETS)  exerted  some  effects  on  EI in CO2 abatement  and energy  efﬁciency  controlling  for other  variables,
grouped  as  internal/external  to  the  ﬁrm,  and  additional  environmental  regulation  factors.  Our  empirical
analyses  show  that a  few  factors  emerge  as  particularly  relevant  such  as relationships  with  other  ﬁrmseywords:
nvironmental innovation
U ETS
IS EU data
anufacturing
and institutions,  sectoral  energy  expenditure  intensity  and  current  and  future  expected  environmental
regulation.  For  the  speciﬁc  role  of  the EU ETS,  we  ﬁnd  that,  on  the  one  hand  ETS  sectors  are  more  likely  to
innovate  than non-ETS  sectors  but  on the  other  hand  that  sector’s  speciﬁc  policy  stringency  is  negatively
associated  with  EI,  possibly  due  to  anticipatory  behavior  from  early  moving  innovative  ﬁrms  and  some
sector idiosyncratic  factors.
©  2014  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.. Introduction
The rapid increase of many environmental problems observed
n recent decades calls for innovations that may  reduce the envi-
onmental impact of economic activity. This is feeding debate on
he drivers of environmental innovations (EI). Although there is
o standardized deﬁnition of EI (cf. Kesidou and Demirel, 2012;
ennings and Rexhauser, 2011; Horbach et al., 2012), the term
s used generally to refer to any product, process, organizational,
ocial or institutional innovation that is able to reduce environmen-
al impact and resource use (Kemp, 2010; OECD, 2009; Rennings,
000; Del Rio Gonzalez, 2009).
Numerous contributions have tried to determine the forces
nderlying EI. In particular, following the classiﬁcation proposed
y Horbach (2008), Horbach et al. (2013) and De Marchi (2012), it
s possible to distinguish drivers of EI that are internal (e.g. training
ctivities) and external (e.g. cooperation with other agents) to the
rm. Among external drivers, particular attention has been devotedPlease cite this article in press as: Borghesi, S., et al., Linking emission
manufacturing industry. Res. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016
o environmental regulation. Following the seminal contributions
y Porter (1991) and Porter and Van der Linde (1995), many stud-
es have tested whether and to what extent environmental policies
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 3356493170.
E-mail address: mzzmsm@unife.it (M.  Mazzanti).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.10.014
048-7333/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.might trigger innovation (cf. Costantini and Mazzanti, 2012, and
the literature cited therein). Most contributions ﬁnd that environ-
mental regulation is the major driving force of EI together with
technology push, market pull and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors (Rennings
and Rexhauser, 2011; Horbach et al., 2012). However, other stud-
ies do not support this view (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; Snyder et al.,
2003), and the results for the innovation effects of environmental
regulation tend to differ according to the level of analysis (Kozluk
and Zipperer, 2013), resulting in a lack of consensus on this issue
in the literature.
This paper intends to contribute to this literature by focusing on
a speciﬁc environmental policy – the European Emission Trading
Scheme (EU ETS) – that is receiving increased attention from scho-
lars and policy-makers. The EU ETS involves about 11,000 industry
ﬁrms in 31 countries and is the ﬁrst transboundary cap-and-trade
system and the largest international scheme for trading green-
house gases (GHG). Although some shortcomings emerged during
its implementation (see Section 2.2 below), the EU ETS is currently
the most important carbon market and is recognized generally as
a suitable prototype for the other ETS that are rapidly spreading
worldwide (Ellerman, 2010). The EU ETS can provide a useful expe- trading to environmental innovation: Evidence from the Italian
/j.respol.2014.10.014
rience for new carbon markets, making a thorough analysis of its
potential innovation effects particularly important. However, its
innovation potential is still debatable; because of its recent origin,
quantitative analyses of the EI effects of this policy are scarce in
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Hunter, 2003).
As to the environmental economics literature, since the early
1990s there has been heated debate over the economic effects ofARTICLEESPOL-3072; No. of Pages 15
 S. Borghesi et al. / Resea
art also due to the problems involved in carrying out robust meso
nd micro level studies of innovative activity in ﬁrms.
To ﬁll this gap, we use Italian ﬁrm level data from the 5th wave
f the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) to examine empirically
hether the EU ETS and its ‘stringency’ are signiﬁcantly related to EI
n the Italian manufacturing industry, taking account of the internal
nd external factors that might be correlated with EI. Manufac-
uring is particularly relevant today given the ‘re-manufacturing
arget’ of the EU, which aims at accomplishing a 20% share of man-
facturing industry in EU GDP by 2020 from its current share of 16%
EEA, 2014).
The analysis of Italian manufacturing provides interesting
nsights for several reasons: (i) Italy is one of the main GHG emit-
ers, ranked 3rd in Europe and 9th among the Annex I countries
UNFCC, 2014), (ii) its industry structure is based mostly on
mall–medium enterprises (SME) that have been actively involved
n innovation in the past although less so in EI (see below), and (iii)
t allows comparison with some other European case-studies that
ave been examined in the literature on this issue (see below).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the litera-
ure on the induced innovation effects of environmental regulation,
evoting particular attention to the relationship between EI and
he EU ETS. Section 3 discusses the rationale behind the construc-
ion of policy stringency ETS related indicators. Section 4 presents
he econometric analyses of EI using CIS 2006–2008 data. Section 5
ffers some concluding remarks on the main results of our analyses.
. Related literature
.1. Environmental regulation and induced environmental
nnovation
Analysis of the forces underlying EI builds on the ﬁndings of
hree main research areas: innovation, management science and
nvironmental economics.1 According to the traditional innova-
ion literature (cf. Carter and Williams, 1959; Kleinknecht and
erspagen, 1990; Schmookler, 1966; Walsh, 1984), innovation
s mainly driven by three factors: (1) advances in science and
&D (supply side or technology-pushed innovations), (2) market
onditions (demand-pull innovations) and (3) new public poli-
ies (regulation-pushed innovations). The supply side (technology
ush) factor is particularly important in the initial phase of devel-
pment of a new product (cf. Rosenberg, 1974; Baumol, 2002),
hile demand from customers, other ﬁrms and exports gener-
lly play a relevant role in the diffusion phase (Pavitt, 1984;
ehfeld et al., 2007). As to the public policies, they can affect
oth the innovation itself and its diffusion, taking several forms
uch as regulations or ﬁnancial support to research and enter-
rises.
The literature on EI is largely based on the explanations under-
ying general innovation, presenting many similarities but also a
ew important differences with respect to the standard innovation
iterature (Horbach, 2008). Like the studies on traditional innova-
ion, the literature on EI examines the role of both demand-side
nd supply-side drivers of EI. Among the latter, particular attention
as been devoted to the ﬁrms’ technological capabilities (Horbach,
008). Since technological and organizational innovations are likelyPlease cite this article in press as: Borghesi, S., et al., Linking emission
manufacturing industry. Res. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016
o develop along complementary lines (Antonioli et al., 2013), the
ole of environment-related organizational innovations, such as
nvironmental Management Systems (EMS) and auditing schemes,
1 The classiﬁcation proposed here is obviously an oversimpliﬁcation of the exist-
ng  literature. Much of the work referred to in this section, lie at intersection among
he three literature strands identiﬁed above. In what follows we group contributions
ccording to the ﬁeld to which they seem more closely allied. PRESS
licy xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
has also received strong attention among the supply-side drivers of
EI (Arimura et al.,  2008; Frondel et al., 2004; Wagner, 2007, 2008;
Johnstone and Labonne, 2009). Among the demand-side factors, a
crucial role is played by public opinion pressure and current and
expected customer demand of environment-friendly products.2
In particular, empirical studies on German manufacturing ﬁrms
underline the importance of collaboration with stakeholders in
inducing EI (Wagner, 2007).
Despite the importance of demand- and supply-side factors,
however, market pull and technology push effects alone are insuf-
ﬁcient to foster EI which “in contrast to such technologies as
microelectronics and telecommunications, [are] normally not self-
enforcing” (Rennings, 1998, p. 11). In fact, although EI have the
same general drivers as standard innovations, they also have spe-
ciﬁc features which make them depart from non-environmental
innovations and enhance the importance of the role played by the
regulation factor for EI (Horbach, 2008; Villiger et al., 2000). In par-
ticular, the environmental nature of EI implies a double externality,
both in terms of knowledge spillovers (as any other innovation)
and in terms of (environmental) public goods (Rennings, 1998,
2000). On the one hand, technological spillovers prevent (eco)
innovators from the full appropriation of the value of the inno-
vation; on the other hand, EI tend to beneﬁt the general public
by improving environmental quality. While the ﬁrst externality
is common to any other technological innovation, the second is
speciﬁc to EI. It follows that ﬁrms generally have little/no incen-
tive to perform EI unless they are induced (or forced) to do so
by a proper environmental regulation. This seems to be con-
ﬁrmed by the empirical literature on this issue, which ﬁnds that
returns of investing in EI are extremely uncertain. From a meta-
analysis of the numerous contributions on this issue (Horváthová,
2010), it turns out that about half of the studies ﬁnd that the
economic returns of “going green” are positive, while the other
half conclude that such returns are absent or even negative.3
Public regulation, therefore, plays a particularly important role
as compared to private incentives in the environmental context,
which makes EI more regulation-driven than standard innova-
tions. In other words, as argued by Rennings (1998, p. 11) the
double externality feature characterizing EI implies a second
specialty of EI with respect to traditional innovations, that is,
“the importance of the regulatory framework as a key determi-
nant of eco-innovative behavior”, (what he deﬁnes “regulatory
push/pull”).
A second research area that investigated the drivers of EI is
the management science literature on Corporate Social Respon-
sibility (CSR). The studies in this ﬁeld generally stress the role of
demand drivers, underlining that they tend to affect ﬁrms’ deci-
sions to undertake EI rather than the level of investment (Kesidou
and Demirel, 2012). Several studies point out that many ﬁrms
make minimum investment in EI and adopt CSR policies mainly
to improve their “green” image (e.g. Suchman, 1995; Bansal and trading to environmental innovation: Evidence from the Italian
/j.respol.2014.10.014
2 Although expectations on demand can play a relevant role for EI, this is not
peculiar to such innovations. As a matter of fact, favorable demand conditions have
a  positive effect on EI (cf. Rehfeld et al., 2007; Horbach, 2008; Horbach et al., 2012)
as  well as on standard innovations (Schmookler, 1966). Moreover, when comparing
the  drivers of EI with those of other innovations, Horbach (2008) ﬁnds that demand
expectations are more relevant for the latter.
3 Results largely depend on the kind of EI taken into account. For instance, Ghisetti
and Rennings (2014) ﬁnd that EI that aim at reducing energy and material use are
positively and signiﬁcantly related to ﬁrms’ proﬁtability, while the opposite occurs
for  EI aiming at reducing waste and pollutants, which will not therefore be pursued
in  the absence of environmental regulation.
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Whatever the size of the EU ETS innovation effect, however,
as Rogge et al. (2011, p. 513) point out, “the impact varies sig-
niﬁcantly across technologies, ﬁrms, and innovation dimensions”.
4 The initial impossibility to transfer unused allowances at a later stage caused
the  price of the 2007 allowances to fall to zero while the allowances issued in 2008
traded at more than D 25 (see Fig. A1).
5 Price volatility in Phase III has been less pronounced than in Phase II (the price
range being D 5.84 in Phase III versus D 14.36 in Phase II). However, in Phase III the
price has been stabilizing around a much lower average than in the previous phase
(D  4.56, about half the lowest average annual price (D 8.12) observed in Phase II).
6 To counterbalance this problem, the EU has recently revised the functioning of
the  system by introducing a review of the timetable which determines the supplyARTICLEESPOL-3072; No. of Pages 15
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nvironmental regulation. In particular, following Porter’s contro-
ersial hypothesis, many studies have examined whether more
tringent environmental regulation promotes EI (see Jaffe et al.,
002; Vollebergh, 2007; Popp et al., 2009 for some surveys of the
mpirical literature on this issue). As argued by Kozluk and Zipperer
2013), results are partially ambiguous due to data problems, unsa-
isfactory measures of stringency and estimation strategies. The
mpirical evidence, moreover, is affected by the level at which the
nalysis is conducted – ﬁrm, industry or macro level. Firm level
tudies generally ﬁnd that more stringent environmental policies
end to boost EI (Arimura et al., 2007; Frondel et al., 2008; Johnstone
nd Labonne, 2009; Lanoie et al., 2011, Yang et al., 2012). How-
ver, some studies (Grubb and Ulph, 2002; Kesidou and Demirel,
012) point out that the reaction to strict regulation can vary
cross ﬁrms. Less innovative ﬁrms may  be driven to introduce EI
n order to comply with the required environmental standards,
hile more innovative ﬁrms may  not react to stricter environmen-
al regulation since they tend to undertake EI mainly to enter new
arkets.
Industry level studies provide more conﬂicting results. For
nstance, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) ﬁnd that environmental regula-
ion has positive effects on R&D expenditure in US manufacturing
ndustries, but not on number of patents which is used as a proxy for
I. In a similar study, Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003), instead, ﬁnd
vidence of a small positive effect on patents in US manufacturing
etween 1983 and 1992.
Finally, macro-level cross-country studies ﬁnd a positive rela-
ionship between environmental regulation and EI, but with
ifferent nuances. In particular, Johnstone et al. (2011), using
atent data for 77 countries between 2001 and 2007, ﬁnd that
he perceived stringency of environmental regulation has a pos-
tive effect on EI. A similar result emerges in De Vries and
ithagen (2005), though only one of the three measures of
nvironmental regulation adopted in the paper shows such an
ffect. Klaassen et al. (2005) ﬁnds that differences in environ-
ental regulation stringency across countries promote different
I capabilities, while Popp (2006) underlines that EI decisions are
riven by national rather than foreign/international regulation.
eiter et al. (2011) focus on nine manufacturing industries in 21
uropean countries in the period 1998–2007 and conclude that
nvironmental regulation has a positive, but diminishing impact
n investment.
To sum up, most studies ﬁnd that environmental regulation
riggers EI, but the empirical evidence is affected by the level of
ggregation and still partially controversial.
.2. Studies on EU ETS and EI
While the induced EI effects of environmental regulation are the
bject of a vast literature, there is a smaller subset of studies that
ocus speciﬁcally on the innovation effects of the EU ETS. Analysis
f the latter, however, can provide useful insights to improve its
esign in the future.
Since its introduction in 2005, the EU ETS has experienced
everal implementation problems, such as the initial overalloca-
ion by the National Allocation Plans (Gilbert et al., 2004; Sijm,
005), hacker attacks and the VAT fraud (Frunza et al., 2010), and
arge carbon price volatility (see Fig. A1). Some of these prob-
ems were addressed by the EU by replacing, on the one hand,
he National Allocation Plans with a centralized cap-setting pro-Please cite this article in press as: Borghesi, S., et al., Linking emission
manufacturing industry. Res. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016
ess and, on the other hand, the national registries with a European
nion Transaction Log (EUTL) administered centrally by the Euro-
ean Commission. Moreover, while allowances initially could not
e hoarded for future use, the EU allowed banking, which is “an
mportant tool to avoid short-term supply-demand imbalances PRESS
licy xxx (2014) xxx–xxx 3
and associated price movements” (Newell et al., 2014).4 How-
ever, the price volatility problem still needs to be ﬁxed. In fact,
the price ﬂuctuations that characterized the initial phase of the
EU ETS (2005–2007) occurred also in the second and third phases
(2008–2012 and 2013–2020, respectively). While price volatility
in the ﬁrst phase could be ascribed to a learning phase typical of a
new market, in the subsequent phases it mainly reﬂected the dras-
tic emissions reductions due to the economic crisis which caused
carbon prices to fall sharply to an average annual price of D 4.45 in
2013 (see Fig. A2).5
This problem was  probably further enhanced by the design of
the EU ETS. Although banking can certainly reduce compliance costs
(Aldy and Stavins, 2012), it also contributed to lower demand (and
carbon prices) in the following phases, which possibly exacerbated
the oversupply problem generated by the economic crisis.6
Many theoretical contributions have analyzed the main features
of the EU ETS, discussing its consequences and problems so far (cf.
among others, Requate, 2005; Convery, 2009; Ellerman et al., 2010;
Borghesi, 2011; Zetterberg et al., 2012). However, as Kemp (2010)
and Kemp and Pontoglio (2011) point out, there are very few large
scale empirical investigations of the innovation effects of the EU
ETS, including its pilot phase (2005–2007). Several authors rely on
case studies, an approach that can provide interesting insights, but
is based mainly on sector speciﬁc evidence. For instance, Pontoglio
(2010) highlights innovation deﬁciencies in the Italian paper and
cardboard sector; Tomas et al. (2010) analyze the Portuguese chem-
ical sector and Rogge et al. (2011) study the energy sectors in
Germany.
The studies performed so far provide mixed evidence of the
effects of the EU ETS. Several contributions ﬁnd that the impact
of the EU ETS on innovation in selected sectors has been limited.
Hoffmann (2007), for instance, concludes that the EU ETS has
affected only short term innovation investments in the German
electricity sector. In a similar study involving 42 interviews with
German power sector companies, Rogge and Hoffmann (2010, p.
7639) ﬁnd that “the EU ETS mainly affects the rate and direc-
tion of technological change in power generation technologies, in
large-sized coal-based power generating companies”. In another
important survey of the innovation effects of ETS in the EU power
sector, Schmidt et al. (2012) conclude that the EU ETS has limited
effect on the innovation activities (adoption and R&D) for power
generation technologies. The opposite opinion emerges from the
case-study based investigation by Petsonk and Cozijnsen (2007),
who conclude that the early phases of the EU ETS have already had a
substantial impact on innovation. Similarly, Anderson et al. (2011)
– focusing on a small number of Irish ﬁrms (27) – ﬁnd that the
EU ETS has been somewhat effective in stimulating technological
change. trading to environmental innovation: Evidence from the Italian
/j.respol.2014.10.014
within phase three of the EU ETS and has postponed auctions of about 900 mil-
lion  allowances planned for 2013, 2014 and 2015 (backloading). While the most
recent EU ETS developments are certainly important for the future of this instru-
ment, in the present paper we  focus on the innovation effects of the early phase of
its  implementation since data are not yet available for the later phases of the EU
ETS.
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imilar results emerge from the study by Martin et al. (2011) which
nds that the propensity to innovate differs signiﬁcantly across
ountries, even after controlling for the existing differences in their
ndustry structures. While most of the above-mentioned studies are
ased on small sample sizes, Martin et al.’s is based on some 800
nterviews with managers in six European countries. The authors
nd mixed evidence on ETS related innovation. On the one hand,
TS and non-ETS ﬁrms show few differences in relation to pro-
ess and product innovation; on the other hand, ﬁrms that expect a
tricter EU ETS cap in Phase III are more likely to engage in product
nnovation. Calel and Dechezlepretre (2012) provide another con-
ribution based on a large sample. Using a new data set that covers
43 ETS ﬁrms in several countries, the authors ﬁnd that ﬁrms sub-
ect to the EU ETS have innovated more than unregulated ﬁrms,
oth in general and in terms of low carbon technology. However,
ore reﬁned estimates7 show that the EU ETS has not affected the
irection of technological change. While Calel and Dechezlepretre’s
tudy relies on environment-related patents to capture EI, in what
ollows we use EI data from the 5th Community Innovation Sur-
ey (CIS). We thus analyse innovation data rather than invention
patent) data. One reason is that though patents are a somewhat
ood proxy of innovation capacity only a fraction of inventions
ecome marketed and diffused as innovations (EEA, 2014).
.3. CIS-based studies on environmental regulation and EI
A few recent studies conduct CIS-based econometric analyses
o test the innovation effects of environmental regulation. In par-
icular, using Flemish CIS EI data, Veugelers (2012) examines the
nﬂuence of government intervention on the ﬁrms’ decision to
reate and/or adopt clean innovation. She ﬁnds that policy inter-
entions that are well-designed, combining regulation and taxes
ith subsidies, and are perceived as time consistent have a stronger
mpact on EI, particularly for reducing CO2. Differently from the
resent paper, however, Veugelers (2012) does not focus on the
TS but looks at the inﬂuence of a bundle of instruments rather
han a single policy.8
Using German CIS data, Rennings and Rexhauser (2011) ﬁnd
ong-term effects of environmental regulation on innovation. How-
ver, these effects depend on the type of EI being considered. In
articular, the authors ﬁnd that innovations aimed at increasing
nergy efﬁciency and reducing CO2 emissions are mainly triggered
y waste disposal and resource recycling regulation introduced in
ermany since 1988. Horbach et al. (2012) also examine the Ger-
an  case, using 2009 CIS data to evaluate whether different kinds of
I are driven by different factors. Their ﬁndings suggest that while
he determinants of EI change according to the environmental
roblem being considered, expected future environmental regu-Please cite this article in press as: Borghesi, S., et al., Linking emission
manufacturing industry. Res. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016
ation seems to be a common driver of all environmental product
nnovations. Unlike our study, however, neither of these analyses
f the German case looks at EU ETS speciﬁc effects.
7 To increase the accuracy and robustness of their estimates, the authors match
ach EU ETS ﬁrm in their sample with non-EU ETS ﬁrms that showed similar features
efore 2005 in terms of available resources, demand conditions, regulations etc. This
educes the possibility that the different EI performance derives from factors other
han  the EU ETS. To rule out other unmeasured differences between ETS and non-
TS ﬁrms, the authors employ difference-in-differences estimations which perform
 double difference – between the two  groups of ﬁrms, and over time within each
roup.
8 The author has actually performed some of the estimations including an ETS
ummy  as a robustness check, linking the Flemish ﬁrms in the CIS data with the
U  ETS data. Unfortunately, only six Flemish companies turn out to be both in both
he  CIS and the EU ETS data. Therefore, Veugelers (2012) (p. 1774) concludes that
er  analysis is “unable to evaluate the ETS scheme’s inﬂuence on ﬁrms’ innovation
ehavior”. PRESS
licy xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
A contribution related strictly to the present analysis is Aghion
et al. (2009). To our knowledge, this is the only study on the ETS
effects that looks at CIS data. The authors provide some very inter-
esting insights into the innovation effects of the EU ETS9; however,
their study relies on descriptive statistics rather than econometric
analysis.
The present study is novel in several respects, compared to the
contributions referred to above: (i) it analyzes the EI effects of the
EU ETS by exploiting the 5th CIS 2006–2008, the ﬁrst version to
include EI-related questions; (ii) it is the ﬁrst empirical investiga-
tion of EU ETS and EI to study Italy, one of the major industrialized
countries in the EU28; (iii) compared to case studies and small
size samples, it provides an econometric analysis of a large sam-
ple (6843 ﬁrms); (iv) it constructs a new and pragmatic stringency
indicator by merging sector environmental accounting data with
allowances allocation.
For this purpose, we test the ETS innovation effect with partic-
ular reference to the start-up phase, that is, the effect of the 2005
allocation of quotas on the adoption of EI in Italy over the time
span 2006–2008. The time span between introduction of the ETS
and the observed innovation effects – though rather limited in the
present context – allows to have a clear time lag between the “pol-
icy dose” and the “innovation response”, and it is commonly used in
the literature (cf. Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; Brunnermeier and Cohen,
2003) that evaluate ﬁrms’ reactions to the implementation of new
policies. In addition, in the case of the EU ETS, ﬁrms knew well
in advance about its implementation since the EU’s proposal for
a directive and the actual directive date back to 2002 and 2003
respectively. Thus, the present analysis might be capturing antic-
ipatory behavior by ETS ﬁrms that could have reacted promptly
to the EU ETS by adopting innovations that exonerated them from
purchasing costly pollution permits.
In what follows we  exclude energy sectors since we intend
to focus here on the Italian manufacturing sectors. While the
energy sector is certainly of great importance in the ETS context,
it represents an outlier with totally different features in terms of
innovation and emissions levels, deserving of separate analysis.
The present work, therefore, can be seen as complementing pre-
vious studies (Schmidt et al., 2012; Rogge et al., 2011) that focus
on the energy sector. We  also exclude the service sectors from the
empirical analysis since they are not generally covered by the EU
ETS, a part from a few large energy-consuming installations and
incinerators of Italian hospitals and public institutions with a net
heat exceeding 20 MW.10 Moreover, the service sectors are more
dependent on national regulations and much more heterogeneous
than manufacturing sectors.11
3. ETS stringency indicators
Several variables are used in the literature to measure environ-
mental policy stringency, including pollution abatement costs and
expenditures (PACE), survey-based perceptions of stringency, pol-
icy changes, international environmental treaties, and so on (see trading to environmental innovation: Evidence from the Italian
/j.respol.2014.10.014
Brunel and Levinson, 2013 for a comprehensive review of exist-
ing measures). However, as Kozluk and Zipperer (2013) point out,
all the proxies for regulation stringency adopted so far have some
9 In particular, Aghion et al. (2009) argue that the carbon price in the EU ETS has
been too volatile to create an appropriate incentive for private green innovations.
Gronwald and Ketterer (2012) reach a similar conclusion, pointing out that price
volatility and uncertainty about future scenarios possibly has hampered EI.
10 Among the service sectors, the emissions deriving from the aviation sector are
now included in the EU ETS, but the aviation sector was not covered by the EU ETS
during our observation period as it entered the scheme at a later stage (from 2012).
11 See, for instance, Conway and Nicoletti (2006) for a comparison of market
regulations of different sectors across countries.
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Table 1
Sample description.
Industry ECOEN ECOCO Total
N % N % N
10 70 15.0 62 13.3 467
11  23 21.5 24 22.4 107
12  1 100.0 1 100.0 1
13  49 16.1 41 13.4 305
14  34 8.6 34 8.6 397
15  26 12.7 22 10.8 204
16  53 15.6 41 12.1 339
17  41 21.6 35 18.4 190
18  50 12.0 40 9.6 415
19  18 32.1 14 25.0 56
20 39 26.2 36 24.2 149
21  18 23.7 11 14.5 76
22  79 17.8 52 11.7 445
23  63 16.6 51 13.5 379
24  54 21.4 46 18.3 252
25  131 17.8 89 12.1 736
26  32 19.8 27 16.7 162
27  46 23.6 34 17.4 195
28  100 21.8 88 19.2 458
29  37 31.4 29 24.6 118
30  16 24.6 14 21.5 65
31  56 19.8 43 15.2 283
32  49 17.7 35 12.6 277
33  54 13.3 46 11.3 407ARTICLEESPOL-3072; No. of Pages 15
S. Borghesi et al. / Resea
imitations. The PACE measures, for instance, cannot easily distin-
uish what share of the expenditure is driven by the environmental
egulation and what share by proﬁts, while more event-based
pproaches (measuring policy changes and new environmental
reaties) tend to capture de jure aspects of the environmental
olicies rather than their actual enforcement. For this reason, we
ropose here an alternative approach based on straightforward
omparison of sector emissions and the available allowances. While
he proposed proxy is certainly not immune of possible limitations,
n our opinion it provides a simple and pragmatic approach that
llows us to measure de facto policy stringency.
We construct an ETS policy indicator to capture policy strin-
ency in the ﬁrst allocation phase, which we then employ in the
conometric analysis. The stringency indicator is based on the sim-
le ratio of emissions to allocated allowances:
i =
ei
EUAi
here, ei denotes the emissions of sector i and EUAi the European
nion Allowances allocated to sector i. The more emissions sec-
or i produces and the lower the level of its allowances, the more
tringent is the ETS policy.
The proposed indicator has the advantage of being immediately
nterpretable. In fact, if si > 1, then the amount of permits at disposal
f sector i is lower than its emissions level, therefore, the ETS policy
s actually stringent for that sector. If, on the contrary, si ≤ 1 then
he permits allocated to sector i exceed or are equal to its emissions,
o the ETS policy is not stringent.
To ensure sensitivity and robustness, we exploit two  main
ources of information. We  use 2000–2005 National Accounting
atrix of Environmental Accounts (NAMEA) sector emissions data
Costantini et al., 2011; Tudini and Vetrella, 2012) released by the
talian National Statistics Agency (ISTAT), to introduce a lag with
espect to the innovation information, and data on the allocation
ecisions derived from ofﬁcial Italian Ministry of the Environment
ocumentation (Ministero dell’Ambiente e del Territorio, 2006).
To conduct sensitivity analyses on our results, we con-
tructed three alternatives measures of s: (i) 2005 NAMEA
missions/allocated quotas, (ii) 2000–2005 average NAMEA emis-
ions/allocated quotas, (iii) Ministry of the Environment reported
000 emissions/allocated quotas. The estimation results were
nchanged therefore, in what follows, we report only the ﬁndings
elative to the ﬁrst of these three measures.
In our econometric analysis we ﬁrst run regressions using a
ummy  variable that takes the value 1 for sectors subject to the ETS
nd 0 for all other sectors.12 When the dummy  value is 1, we can
ompute stringency indicators for the ETS sectors13 and restrict the
conometric analysis to this subset of sectors, introducing the strin-
ency indicator among the model covariates. The use of both the
TS dummy  and the stringency indicators among the EI regressors
llows us to distinguish the impact on EI deriving from the pres-Please cite this article in press as: Borghesi, S., et al., Linking emission
manufacturing industry. Res. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016
nce of the ETS, from the effect generated by the (sector speciﬁc)
tringency of the regulation.
12 See Table A1 for a description of all the sectors included and the corresponding
axonomy. The sectors subject to the ETS are: paper and paper products (industry
ode 17), coke and reﬁnery (code 19), ceramics and cement (code 23) and metallurgy
codes 24–25).
13 The value of the stringency indicators si (where i denotes the industry code) for
he sectors taken into account are as follows: s17 = 1.067 (paper), s19 = 0.905 (coke
nd reﬁned petroleum products), s23 = 1.487 (ceramic and cement), s24–25 = 1.470
metallurgy).Total 1139 17.6 915 14.1 6483
4. The data and the model
In order to analyze EI in the Italian manufacturing industry and
to test the effects of the ETS, we  exploit data on innovation and CO2
emissions dimensions from different sources. The main data source
is the CIS dataset. The 2008 wave of the CIS was  the ﬁrst to ask about
EI adoption in line with the deﬁnition of EI developed by the Mea-
suring EI (MEI) project funded by the European Commission’s 6th
Framework Program (Kemp and Pearson, 2007).14 The Appendix
reports the exact wording of the CIS question which is used to
proxy EI. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics by industry of
the sample.
In order to deﬁne our ETS policy stringency indicator, as pointed
out above, we  use two  data sources: (i) 2005 NAMEA emissions data
(with the average 2000–2005 as an alternative to capture medium
run trends), and (ii) the Italian allocation of ETS quotas by sector
which we  extracted from Ministry documents.15 These sector data
are merged with ﬁrm data, which is a standard procedure given the
absence of ﬁrm level emissions data (see e.g., Cole et al., 2009, who
merge individual data on wages with ﬁrm/sector pollution data).
Given the binary nature of our two EI dependent variables,
we estimate a probit model where the dependent variable Yi is a
dummy  that takes the value 1 if ﬁrm i introduces an EI (to reduce
CO2 or increase energy efﬁciency) and 0 otherwise. The full set of
covariates is described in Table 2.
We classify our independent variables into three main groups: trading to environmental innovation: Evidence from the Italian
/j.respol.2014.10.014
(i) internal to the ﬁrm (e.g. training), (ii) external to the ﬁrm
(e.g. cooperation), and (iii) policy factors at both regional and
national/EU level (e.g. local funding, ETS).
14 The data used in this work come from the ISTAT “Rilevazione statistica
sull’innovazione nelle imprese. Anni 2006–2008”. Computations were performed at
the  ISTAT Laboratorio per l’Analisi dei Dati Elementari (ADELE) in compliance with
the legislation on the protection of statistical conﬁdentiality and protection of per-
sonal data. The results and opinions expressed in the paper are those of the authors
who take responsibility for them; they do not represent ofﬁcial opinions.
15 Note that CIS data are anonymous. Therefore, even if ﬁrm emissions data were
available (which is not the case), matching with EI CIS data would be unfeasible.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Mean Std. dev.
Dependent variables
Ecoen (Energy reduction per unit of
output)
0.175 0.380
Ecoco (CO2 reduction) 0.141 0.348
Factors ‘external to the ﬁrm’
Sentg (information
relationships—enterprise group)
0.432 0.495
Ssup (information
relationships—suppliers)
0.365 0.481
Scli (information
relationships—clients)
0.284 0.451
Scom (information
relationships—competitors)
0.151 0.358
Sins  (information
relationships—private research
institutions)
0.209 0.406
Suni (information
relationships—university)
0.078 0.268
Sgmt (information
relationships—public research
institutions)
0.039 0.195
Scon (information
relationships—conferences)
0.214 0.410
Sjou (information
relationships—journals)
0.144 0.351
Spro (information
relationships—industrial association
services)
0.125 0.331
Group (membership to business
groups)
0.297 0.457
ln(en-exp) (energy expenditure per
unit of value)
−3.682 0.665
Factors ‘internal to the ﬁrm’
RTR (training programmes in the ﬁrm) 0.259 0.438
lprod06 (labor productivity in 2006) 11.88 0.816
R&D (R&D programmes in the ﬁrm) 0.305 0.460
Policy factors
Fund (public funding to innovation) 0.125 0.331
Ets-dummy (sector subject to ets)a 0.248 0.432
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Table 3
Correlation matrix (ETS stringency and CIS-related variables).
STRINGENCY ENREG ENREGF ENGRA ENDEM ENAGR
STRINGENCY 1.000
ENREG 0.037 1.000
ENREGF 0.017 0.497 1.000
ENGRA 0.006 0.290 0.340 1.000
ENDEM −0.018 0.308 0.358 0.337 1.000
ENAGR 0.001 0.301 0.335 0.301 0.439 1.000
ENREG = current environmental regulations or environmental taxes; ENREGF =
expected environmental regulations or environmental taxes; ENGRA = grants or
tions of EI adoption of interest in this paper: EI related to reducing
energy use per unit of output (ECOEN) and reducing CO2 emis-
sions (ECOCO). For each dependent variable, we  ﬁrst describe thea Dummy  variable.
alues for stringency indicators: s17 = 1.067 (paper), s19 = 0.905 (coke and reﬁned
etroleum products), s23 = 1.487 (ceramic and cement), s24–25 = 1.470 (metallurgy).
The choice of the covariates taken into account reﬂects that
f similar contributions in the literature, which makes our results
omparable with the ﬁndings of previous studies. In particular, fol-
owing Veugelers (2012), we introduced among the covariates a set
f variables deriving from a group of questions in the CIS about the
ole of the following factors underlying EI: current (ENREG) and
xpected (ENREGF) environmental regulations or environmental
axes; grants or other public ﬁnancial incentives for EI (ENGRA);
xisting or expected demand from customers for EI (ENDEM),
nd voluntary codes of practice used in the sector or sectoral
greements to stimulate eco-friendly practices (ENAGREE). Table 3
eports the correlation matrix between these variables and the
TS stringency indicator (our additional explanatory variable with
espect to previous studies).
When presenting the results, these variables are grouped
ogether in the table to help the reader better identify them, and to
acilitate comparison with previous studies. However, if we look
t the three group classiﬁcation adopted in the paper, some of
hese variables can clearly be classiﬁed as policy factors (ENREG
nd ENREGF, ENGRA), and others as factors external to the ﬁrm
ENDEM and ENAGREE).Please cite this article in press as: Borghesi, S., et al., Linking emission
manufacturing industry. Res. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016
Among the policy factors, we included an ETS dummy  for sectors
ubject to the system and the stringency indicator described above,
o differentiate between the roles of the policy and its stringency.
oreover, following Horbach et al. (2012), we introduced amongother public ﬁnancial incentives for EI; ENDEM = existing or expected demand from
customers for EI; ENAGREE = voluntary codes of practice used in the sector or sec-
toral agreements to stimulate eco-friendly practices.
the explanatory variables public funding for innovation (FUND) in
addition to the variable ENGRA, to distinguish public support for
innovation in general, from that speciﬁcally related to EI.
The covariates that are internal to the ﬁrm include the role of
ﬁrm size (proxied by number of employees), labor productivity,
and ﬁrm training (Rtr) and R&D (Rd) programs. The inclusion of
the size variable in the estimation model addresses the hypothe-
sis that large companies may  have a greater incentive to innovate
to comply with environmental regulation since their larger scale
of production causes more pollution. The other internal variables
may capture ﬁrms’ capacity to absorb external knowledge and abil-
ity to improve their technological capabilities. Previous studies
(e.g. Horbach, 2008; Horbach et al., 2012; Rennings and Rexhauser,
2011; Veugelers, 2012) provide conﬂicting results for these vari-
ables. For example, ﬁrm size was found by Rennings and Rexhauser
(2011) to be related positively to most kinds of EI, but Veugelers
(2012) ﬁnds it to be unrelated to EI in CO2 emissions and energy use
(our dependent variables). Similarly, while Horbach (2008) ﬁnds
R&D to be an important driver of EI, other contributions ﬁnd it to
be unrelated or negatively related to EI (Horbach et al., 2013) and
even a barrier to the exploitation of external interactions (Ghisetti
et al., 2013).
Among factors external to the ﬁrm, we examined whether EI
are related to intensity of sector energy expenditure (i.e. per unit of
value, EN-EXP). It can reasonably be expected that a high intensity
of energy expenditure may  trigger EI to reduce the ﬁrms’ overall
production costs. This correlation could be even stronger for ETS
ﬁrms which have a double incentive to produce EI (to reduce pro-
duction costs, and to avoid costly purchase of tradable permits).
In line with previous contributions (Horbach et al., 2012; Ghisetti
et al., 2013), we  also examined whether EI activities are correlated
to belonging to a business group (GROUP) and to having informa-
tion relationships with several different sources (the enterprise
group, suppliers, clients, competitors etc.). Finally, we included
geographic and industry dummies to control for geographic and
sector-speciﬁc unobserved cross-sectional differences.
Instead of reporting the coefﬁcients, we  report the marginal
effects of each independent variable (whether continuous or not),
that is, the impact of a unit variation in the covariate on the prob-
ability of adopting EI.16
5. Econometric evidence
We  present the results focusing on the two main speciﬁca- trading to environmental innovation: Evidence from the Italian
/j.respol.2014.10.014
16 The STATA command dprobit was used for this (see also Veugelers, 2012). Note
that  the statistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients does not change when marginal
effects are computed.
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Table  4
ECOEN regressions—all industry sectors.
Estimation
method: dprobit
[1] [2] [3]
dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value
Ln(employees) 0.010* 1.69 −0.006 −1.01 −0.007 −1.15
RTR  0.046*** 3.76 0.013 1.13 0.014 1.22
Group  0.024** 2.10 0.024** 2.06 0.024** 2.03
R&D  0.0002 0.03 −0.014 −1.30 −0.015 −1.39
Fund  0.051*** 4.41 0.043*** 3.59 0.044*** 3.69
Ln(productivity) 0.021*** 2.93 0.013** 2.12 0.012** 1.98
Sentg  0.060*** 4.01 0.039** 2.41 0.039** 2.35
ETS–dummy 0.052*** 8.28 0.045*** 3.56 – –
Enreg  – – 0.154*** 11.18 0.153*** 11.02
Enregf – – 0.180*** 12.70 0.180*** 12.63
Engra  – – 0.040*** 2.70 0.039** 2.57
Endem – – −0.007 −0.54 −0.009 −0.69
Enagr  0.045*** 3.10 0.047*** 3.21
EMS  – – – – 0.012 0.89
en-exp – – – – 1.616*** 121.04
Geographic dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
N.  obs. 6483 6483 6483
Pseudo  R2 0.051 0.147 0.147
AIC  5737.7 5173.8 5106.9
BIC  5819.0 5289.0 5221.9
CC  (%) 82.4 83.4 83.5
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
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fact that R&D ultimately is a proxy for general innovation-related
capacity.20 Speciﬁc environmental R&D would probably be needed
to capture the EI effects of R&D efforts.*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
ote:  Standard errors are clustered at industry level (24 sectors).
IC = Akaike information criterion, BIC = Bayesian information criterion, CC = Correc
ndings for internal and external factors and then discuss those for
he policy factors.
.1. Environmental innovations for energy efﬁciency
.1.1. Internal and external factors
Tables 4 and 5 present estimation results for EI in energy efﬁ-
iency, for the whole set of ﬁrms, and for the ETS ﬁrms only,
espectively.
Each table reports ﬁndings obtained ﬁrst excluding (column 1)
nd then including (column 2) the set of variables deriving from the
IS questions on the potential drivers of EI. The speciﬁcation in col-
mn  3 shows the results obtained when including two  additional
environmental related controls’: sector energy expenditure per
nit of value (among external factors), and Environmental Manage-
ent Systems (EMS, a ﬁrm internal organizational change factor)
ntroduced before 2006.
We reported in the tables the Pseudo-R2 that measures the
oodness of ﬁt of the model. We  also add the Count-R2 or Correctly
lassiﬁed indicator (CC), that maps the (continuous) predicted
robabilities deriving from the model into a binary variable (0,1)
nd then compares the latter with the actual binary outcome
ariable.17
To provide some guidance on the model selection we  present
ome measures that are commonly used to assess model ﬁt, namely,
he Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian informa-
ion criterion (BIC). These two criteria take into consideration both
he goodness of ﬁt and the complexity of the model introducingPlease cite this article in press as: Borghesi, S., et al., Linking emission
manufacturing industry. Res. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016
 penalty which is an increasing function of the number of esti-
ated parameters. This allows to reduce the risk of overﬁtting,
hat is, the artiﬁcial increase in the goodness of ﬁt deriving from the
17 When the continuous predicted probability is greater than 0.5 the value of the
redicted binary variable is set to 1, while when it is less than 0.5 the value of
he  predicted binary variable is set to 0. Then the number of correct predictions is
omputed comparing the actual and the predicted binary variables. The result is
ivided by total counts.ssiﬁed.
introduction of additional parameters. The AIC and BIC use different
penalty terms (being higher for the BIC) and have different prac-
tical performances and asymptotic properties,18 but in both cases
the preferred model is the one with the minimum AIC (BIC) value.
The results of this battery of indicators for the estimated models for
EI in energy efﬁciency show similar performances for speciﬁcations
2 and 3, which are preferred with respect to the ﬁrst one.
As to the external sources, we  show that they matter signiﬁ-
cantly and provide information on multiple factors related to EI
adoption. In particular, being part of a business group (GROUP)
turns out to be important for EI in energy efﬁciency for all industries
as well as for the subset of ETS ﬁrms. This is an interesting ﬁnding
which conﬁrms that EI activity is heavily embedded in network
relationships (Cainelli et al., 2012). A number of speciﬁc ‘informa-
tion sources’ are relevant for increasing innovation capabilities and
innovation adoption. For example, for the whole set of ﬁrms, receiv-
ing information from other ﬁrms in the same group (SENTG) is
relevant for energy efﬁciency (reinforcing the advantages of being
part of a business group), while suppliers, clients and conference
attendance are the main source of EI for ETS ﬁrms.19
Among internal sources, we ﬁnd that the presence of R&D
expenditure is never signiﬁcant (conﬁrming the results in Horbach
et al., 2013). In our view, this lack of signiﬁcance is related to the trading to environmental innovation: Evidence from the Italian
/j.respol.2014.10.014
18 See Burnham and Anderson (2002) and Yang (2005) for a comparison between
the  AIC and BIC.
19 Due to space constraints, each table reports only the coefﬁcients of those
‘information sources’ that are statistically signiﬁcant in at least one of the three
speciﬁcations. The results for the other (non-statistically signiﬁcant) information
sources variables are available upon request.
20 The evolutionary economics and innovation studies literatures show that R&D
is  often a factor embodying innovative (absorptive) capacity rather than strong
internal ﬁrm efforts for comprehensive and environment-speciﬁc productivity
enhancement. Therefore, it is not a key determinant of more radical forms of
innovation and performance (Breschi et al., 2000).
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Table 5
ECOEN regressions: only ETS industries.
Estimation method: dprobit [1.] [2.] [3.]
dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value
Ln(employees) 0.010 0.57 −0.015 −1.17 −0.015 −1.26
RTR  0.026 1.46 −0.010 −0.93 −0.010 −0.92
Group 0.022 1.24 0.034** 2.37 0.034** 2.36
R&D  −0.001 −0.04 −0.013 −0.53 −0.013 −0.52
Fund  0.012 0.67 0.019 0.83 0.019 0.83
Ln(productivity) 0.023** 2.19 0.010 1.25 0.009 1.05
Ssup  0.027** 2.11 0.019 1.28 0.019 1.26
SCLI  0.060*** 5.29 0.037** 2.43 0.036** 2.40
SCON  0.072*** 3.00 0.060** 2.55 0.060** 2.60
ETS-stringency −0.009*** −7.55 −0.016*** −8.41 −0.016*** −8.71
Enreg  – – 0.161*** 6.23 0.160*** 6.17
Enregf – – 0.170*** 12.04 0.169*** 11.39
Engra  – – 0.044 1.50 0.044 1.48
Endem – – 0.010 0.26 0.009 0.24
Enagr  – – 0.032 1.30 0.031 1.26
EMS  – – – – −0.010 −0.51
Geographic dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.  obs. 1.613 1.613 1.613
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.134 0.134
AIC  1503.5 1366.6 1366.4
BIC  1525.1 1388.2 1388.0
CC  (%) 80.6 81.2 81.3%
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
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that the most innovative ﬁrms might have adopted an anticipatory
behavior: since the idea of the EU ETS Directive was known well
in advance, these ﬁrms could have started abating their emissions
21 This seems consistent with the ﬁndings in the empirical CIS-based literature
in this ﬁeld. Hottenrott and Peters (2011), for instance, ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher
innovation capabilities are more likely to face ﬁnancing constraints, holding equal*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
ote: Standard errors are clustered at industry level (24 sectors).
IC = Akaike information criterion, BIC = Bayesian information criterion, CC = Correc
The coefﬁcients of all the other internal factors considered turn
ut to be positive and statistically signiﬁcant when excluding the
et of CIS-related variables on the motivations of EI adoption (col-
mn  1). However, only labor productivity still matters when these
ariables are introduced into the model, (which tends to improve
he model’s performance as shown by the AIC, BIC and CC indicators
eported in the tables). Among the CIS-related variables, current
nd expected presence of environmental regulation or taxes are
articularly highly correlated to EI, for all industry sectors (Table 4)
nd for ETS ﬁrms only (Table 5), while the other CIS-related vari-
bles (customers’ demand for EI—ENDEM, grants for EI—ENGRA and
he environmental sectoral agreements—ENAGREE) do not play a
ole in EI for ETS ﬁrms. This would seem to suggest that ETS ﬁrms
end to perform EI mainly to comply with environmental regula-
ion, thus emphasizing the crucial importance of policy factors for
I (see Section 5.1.2).
Finally, notice that energy expenditure intensity is highly cor-
elated to EI, which is a plausible and expected result: the higher
he ﬁrms’ energy expenditures per unit of value, the higher will be
he incentive to ﬁnd suitable product/process/organizational inno-
ations that allow them to improve their energy efﬁciency. This
esult seems consistent with the ﬁndings in Horbach et al. (2012,
. 117) who conclude that “for energy savings cost savings are the
ain motivation”.
.1.2. Policy factors
If we consider all industry sectors (Table 4), local public sup-
ort, i.e. regional funding, is a main factor in innovation in energy
fﬁciency: ﬁrms that receive public funding (FUND) are more likely
o adopt EI. However, if we restrict the analysis to the ETS sectors
Table 5), public funding is shown not to be signiﬁcantly related to
I. Below, we ﬁnd similar results using CO2 abatement. This ratherPlease cite this article in press as: Borghesi, S., et al., Linking emission
manufacturing industry. Res. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016
urprising result could have several explanations. First, it might
eﬂect the fact that the more innovative ETS sectors considered
end to innovate anyway – whatever the level of the public funds
or innovation activity – due to the presence of the ETS, whilessiﬁed.
non-ETS sectors (that have a lower incentive to innovate since
they are not part of the ETS) will decide to innovate only if they can
rely on public support. Second, in Italy, public support is relatively
small, therefore it does not affect the decision to innovate of the
most innovative ﬁrms, whereas it can make a difference for those
ﬁrms that generally perform little innovation and may  decide to
do so to take advantage of regional funding.21
Evidence on the core ETS issue is mixed. When we test the ETS
effect by including a dummy  variable (ETS-DUMMY) in the whole
sample, the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant and positive (Table 4). ETS
sectors are more innovative: they are characterized by a higher
level of EI than non-ETS sectors. Inclusion in the EU ETS has been
seen by these sectors as signaling a policy change that requires
a corresponding change in their production technologies that are
particularly energy intensive, while non-ETS sectors lagged behind
because of the absence of such a signal.
For the sub-sample of the ETS sectors (more than 1600 ﬁrms),
we ﬁnd that ETS stringency is negatively correlated to EI (Table 5).
The negative association indicates that the ETS is less stringent
for sectors with more intense EI activities. This apparently coun-
terintuitive result may  reﬂect the regulator’s decision to set more
stringent targets to the less innovative sectors in order to induce
them to increase their innovation activities. Another possible expla-
nation for the negative relationship between stringency and EI is trading to environmental innovation: Evidence from the Italian
/j.respol.2014.10.014
internal availability of funds. Therefore, they are used to planning their innovation
activities independent of public support, especially in a country like Italy where this
support is relatively small. In Italy local funding is often perceived as temporary,
and therefore not included in ﬁrms’ planning activity as a reliable instrument for
the  future, as conﬁrmed by the interviews discussed below.
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efore the scheme was introduced, thus contributing to reducing
heir sector stringency level (emissions/allowances). This expla-
ation, which is in line with the crucial role of future expected
nvironmental regulation discussed above, suggests the possible
xistence of a reverse relationship (in which innovation affects
tringency). Due to data constraints, in fact, in this context we can
nly estimate a reduced form which does not allow us to infer
he direction of causality among variables. A closer look at the
ata suggests an alternative sector-speciﬁc explanation so that the
bserved result might not be counterintuitive, and may  have plau-
ible reasons, at least in the current Italian situation. The ceramic
nd cement sector, in fact, has the highest stringency indicator but
he lowest share of ﬁrms adopting energy efﬁciency EI (17% of total
rms) compared to the other three sectors (paper and cardboard
8%, coke and reﬁnery 32%, and metallurgy 21%). This suggests the
xistence of an idiosyncratic sectoral weakness that is particularly
vident when we compare Italy to other EU countries: among the
iggest EU members, the Italian ceramic and cement sector ranks
ery low for EI adoption (see Table A2).
To get a deeper understanding of this (apparently) counterin-
uitive result, following the seminal contribution by Greene et al.
1989), we adopted a mixed methods research design, conducting
everal interviews with ETS-sector representatives to complement
ur econometric analysis.22
We  conducted four interviews with experts from universities,
nternational and government institutions, ﬁve with managers of
TS ﬁrms operating in the sectors considered, ﬁve with the Indus-
rial Associations corresponding to the sectors,23 and one with the
epresentative from the Italian Industrial Association (Conﬁdus-
ria). In all cases, we contacted people responsible for the EU ETS
ithin the ﬁrm or association.
Although the interviews obviously cover a very limited subset of
he Italian ﬁrms operating in the ETS-sectors, they can provide some
nteresting insights into the perceived impact of ETS policy on inno-
ation in the speciﬁc sectors involved. The respondents were from
ectors with very different emission levels and represent diverse
ontexts ranging from the relatively clean pulp and paper sector
ith very low total emissions, to the extremely polluting ceramic
nd cement sector which is about six times more polluting than the
ulp and paper sector (cf. Table A3).
Interviews were either face-to-face or by phone, and were
ecorded subject to the interviewee’s permission; interviewers
ook detailed notes when such permission was not granted.24
Since experimental evidence shows that a respondent’s answers
an be manipulated by simply changing the order of the questions
nd how they are framed, we used the same questionnaire for all
nterviewees. The common questions provided the general frame-
ork to allow comparability among participants’ responses. During
he interviews, we allowed participants to expand on their answers
nd provide anecdotal evidence or personal opinions to add rele-
ant detail that would not have emerged from a response to the
uestions.Please cite this article in press as: Borghesi, S., et al., Linking emission
manufacturing industry. Res. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016
The interviewees were asked speciﬁcally whether reported
hanges in EI were due to the EU ETS or due to other factors, includ-
ng other policies.
22 As Greene et al. (1989) (p. 256) point out, in order to strengthen the validity of the
nquiry results, multiple methods should be used to address the same phenomenon
ince “all methods have inherent biases and limitations”. Although our analysis is
ased mainly on a quantitative method, use of a complementary qualitative method
an  enhance or cast doubt on the validity of the econometric results. We thank an
nonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions on this point.
23 The industry associations interviewed were: Conﬁndustria Ceramica, AITEC –
ssociazione Italiana Tecnico Economica Cemento, Assocarta, Unione Petrolifera,
CAI – Associazione Costruttori di Acciaio Italiani.
24 Interview transcripts are available upon request. PRESS
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Interestingly, all the interviewees stated that the ETS policy was
not stringent enough for the ceramic and cement sector. In par-
ticular, the interview with the ETS team of the Italian Industrial
Association (Conﬁndustria, which includes all industry sectors and
thus can provide a broader viewpoint) conﬁrmed that the ceramics
and cement industries have experienced particular problems com-
pared to other sectors, in reacting to the introduction of the ETS
system. These problems are related to the fragmented structure of
this sector (many small and medium sized ﬁrms organized in dis-
tricts) and its high pollution intensity. Most ﬁrms initially aimed
only at being compliant, by buying and using their allowances, and
adopted a precautionary approach.
For the paper and cardboard sector, interviews with man-
agers highlighted that the innovation effects of the 1st ETS phase
were negligible due to policy uncertainty and price volatility. This
seems to conﬁrm the importance of expectations regarding envi-
ronmental regulation for EI, that emerged from the results for
the ENREGF variable. Interviewees argued that more attention
should be devoted to the typology of innovations, which is in
line with previous ﬁndings (Horbach et al., 2012). For example,
respondents pointed out that sectors are highly idiosyncratic, with
paper-producing ﬁrms which shifted from oil to gas many years
ago, and co-generation occurring in most ﬁrms (which is not recog-
nized in the ETS scheme). A general stimulus for EI through pricing
might not be effective due to high sector technology idiosyncrasy.
Overall, the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, ETS ﬁrms inno-
vate through the incentive offered by the new ETS market; on
the other hand, ETS intrinsic stringency is negatively associated
with innovation, mostly because of sector structural factors that
inﬂuence the path-dependent patterns of EI diffusion among ﬁrms.
Negative lock-in effects appear to characterize the ceramic sec-
tor, a leading sector of Italian industry, with historically critical
environmental performance (Marin and Mazzanti, 2013).
5.2. Environmental innovations for carbon abatement
5.2.1. Internal and external factors
For CO2 abatement technology adoption, the evidence is simi-
lar to that for energy efﬁciency. The reported indicators (Pseudo-R2,
AIC, BIC and CC) suggest that in general the preferred model speciﬁ-
cations are those taking CIS-related variables into account (models
2 and 3), both for all industry sectors (Table 6) and for ETS sectors
only (Table 7). Focusing in particular on the whole set of indus-
try sectors (Table 6), even in the case of CO2 emissions reduction,
labor productivity and energy expenditure intensity are positively
associated with EI in all the model speciﬁcations, capturing the
importance of human capital and cost-saving motivations for EI.
The main difference with respect to EI in energy efﬁciency is that
being part of a group does not seem to be sufﬁcient for EI in
CO2 abatement, while information/relational factors are even more
relevant: external sources play an important role in the adop-
tion of relatively more radical technologies associated with CO2
abatement. In particular, support provided by industry associa-
tions (SPRO), conference participation (SCON) and relationships
with public research institutions (SGMT) matter for EI in CO2 emis-
sion reduction. This is coherent with the ‘public good’ nature of
CO2 abatement which requires breakthrough technologies that are
beyond the capabilities of individual ﬁrms. In general, informa-
tion factors correlated with EI adoption seem to differ between
CO2 abatement and energy efﬁciency, depending upon the differ-
ent kinds of ‘technology adoption’. Both cases, however, highlight trading to environmental innovation: Evidence from the Italian
/j.respol.2014.10.014
the important role of external sources of knowledge for EI.
If we  focus on ETS sectors only (Table 7), external sources of
information are still relevant for EI, but the most important factors
are the policy covariates (see Section 5.2.2).
Please cite this article in press as: Borghesi, S., et al., Linking emission trading to environmental innovation: Evidence from the Italian
manufacturing industry. Res. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.10.014
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Table 6
ECOCO regressions–all industry sectors.
Estimation
method: dprobit
[1.] [2.] [3.]
dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value
Ln(employees) 0.010** 1.99 −0.004 −1.01 −0.005 −1.22
RTR  0.035*** 3.77 0.005 0.73 0.005 0.70
Group  0.019 1.63 0.015 1.40 0.015 1.36
R&D  0.022** 2.20 0.006 0.69 0.004 0.48
Fund  0.028** 2.21 0.022* 1.65 0.023* 1.70
Ln(productivity) 0.024*** 4.49 0.015*** 2.96 0.014*** 2.76
Sgmt  0.050*** 2.75 0.028* 1.70 0.026 1.53
Scon  0.042*** 4.21 0.026*** 2.72 0.028*** 2.87
Sjou  −0.022* −1.66 −0.037*** −3.37 −0.037*** −3.37
Spro  0.048*** 3.78 0.027** 2.20 0.028** 2.24
ETS–dummy 0.034*** 4.90 0.025*** 3.99 – –
Enreg  – – 0.149*** 11.45 0.148*** 11.35
Enregf – – 0.169*** 12.09 0.166*** 11.88
Engra  – – 0.017 1.21 0.018 1.26
Endem – – 0.005 0.47 0.004 0.45
Enagr  – – 0.049*** 3.27 0.048*** 3.12
EMS  – – – – 0.019 1.39
en-exp – – – – 1.272*** 95.41
Geographic dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy  Yes Yes Yes
N.  obs. 6483 6483 6483
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.179 0.178
AIC  5003.7 4371.7 4318.2
BIC  5105.4 4507.3 4453.5
CC  (%) 85.9 86.8 86.9
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Note: Standard errors are clustered at industry level (24 sectors).
AIC = Akaike information criterion, BIC = Bayesian information criterion, CC = Correctly Classiﬁed.
Table 7
ECOCO regressions: only ETS industries.
Estimation method: dprobit [1.] [2.] [3.]
dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value dF/dx t-value
Ln(employees) 0.016 1.57 −0.006 −0.85 −0.008 −1.14
RTR  0.031 1.43 −0.003 −0.18 −0.004 −0.21
Group −0.004 −0.19 0.002 0.10 0.001 0.06
R&D  0.017 1.02 0.003 0.19 0.005 0.26
Fund  −0.012 −0.44 −0.010 −0.32 −0.010 −0.33
Ln(productivity) 0.030*** 4.55 0.015 1.46 0.012 1.27
Scon  0.056*** 6.52 0.036** 2.25 0.035** 2.13
Spro  0.062** 2.50 0.033* 1.65 0.033* 1.71
ETS-stringency −0.022*** −6.20 −0.024*** −5.34 −0.025*** −5.43
Enreg  – – 0.119*** 4.75 0.117*** 4.88
Enregf – – 0.205*** 10.16 0.199*** 10.59
Engra  – – 0.051*** 4.64 0.056*** 4.83
Endem – – −0.004 −0.70 −0.008 −1.47
Enagr  – – 0.031 1.02 0.028 0.89
Ems  – – – – 0.053** 1.96
Geographic dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.  obs. 1.613 1.613 1.613
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.179 0.183
AIC  1274.5 1107.3 1101.9
BIC  1296.1 1128.9 1123.4
CC  (%) 85.4 85.2 85.9
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Note: Standard errors are clustered at industry level (24 sectors).
AIC = Akaike information criterion, BIC = Bayesian information criterion, CC = Correctly Classiﬁed.
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Interestingly, the market pull effect proxied by customers’
emand for EI does not appear to be related to EI, for either all
ndustry sectors or ETS sectors only. This result, which differs
rom previous studies (e.g. Veugelers, 2012; Horbach et al., 2012),
an probably be ascribed to the relatively low market pressure
or cleaner policies and technologies characterizing Italy during
he observed period, in which policy commitment on the carbon
genda was not prioritized. Italy also experienced some signs of
he incoming 2008–2009 economic downturn well within 2007.
ack of internal demand characterized the whole decade.
The coefﬁcient of EMS  is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
nly for ETS ﬁrms. This is consistent with what would be expected
iven the quite radical content of EMS  as an organizational strategy
hich is correlated with CO2 abatement decisions in the sub set of
TS sectors (Wagner, 2007).
.2.2. Policy factors
Most of the results on the policy factors discussed above for EI
n energy efﬁciency apply also to EI in CO2 abatement. In particular,
ven in this case, current and expected environmental regulation
lay a major role for EI, for all industries and for ETS sectors only,
onﬁrming the importance of government regulation emphasized
y other studies (cf. Veugelers, 2012; Horbach et al., 2012; Rennings
nd Rexhauser, 2011).
Even in the case of CO2 abatement innovation, ETS sectors show
igniﬁcantly larger adoption shares in terms of EI than non-ETS
ectors (Table 6). This may  be explained by ETS sectors having
ore demanding emissions reduction targets than non-ETS sectors,
hich may  induce the former to innovate more than the latter.25
Restricting the analysis to ETS ﬁrms only, we observe that the
esults for policy factors obtained for ECOCO (Table 7) largely
esemble those obtained for ECOEN (Table 5) with a few differences
hat can be ascribed to the different types of technologies involved
e.g. shifting to lower emitting fossil fuels, shifting to renewables,
O2 capture and storage, etc). However, even in this case, the strin-
ency indicator we test is negatively related to EI. Again, sector data
ighlight that ceramic/cement ﬁrms have the most stringent ETS
llocation and are the least innovative in relation to CO2 abatement
their CO2 EI adoption rate is 13% vs. 18% for paper and cardboard,
nd metallurgy, and 25% for coke and reﬁnery). The idiosyncratic
eatures of Italian ceramic ﬁrms probably hinder adoption of radi-
ally new CO2 abatement technologies, generating a negative effect
n EI adoption that is not counterbalanced by the positive impact
f support from networking and external sources of knowledge.
. Conclusions
As previous studies have pointed out (cf. Rennings, 1998;
orbach, 2008), environmental regulation plays a particularly
mportant role among the driving forces underlying EI due to the
ouble externality issue characterizing these innovations.
In order to contribute to the literature on the link between
I and environmental regulation, we focused here on a speciﬁc
nvironmental policy that is gaining increasing attention at the
nternational level, the EU ETS. In particular, this paper provides
ew microeconometric evidence on the role of the EU ETS for inno-Please cite this article in press as: Borghesi, S., et al., Linking emission
manufacturing industry. Res. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016
ation in energy efﬁciency and CO2 abatement in manufacturing
ectors. Exploiting EI data for Italian ﬁrms from the CIS, we inves-
igated the link between the EU ETS and EI controlling for several
25 While for ETS sectors the CO2 emission reduction target (−20% by 2020) was
nnounced since January 2007 (and formally introduced in April 2009), non-ETS
ectors were not subject to any formal emissions reduction targets until March 2013.
n  any case, the non-ETS targets are much less strict (−10% by 2020). PRESS
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covariates that can be classiﬁed in three groups: internal to the ﬁrm,
external to the ﬁrm, and policy factors.
Our estimates show that EI are associated with various fac-
tors, both internal and external to the ﬁrm. External forces, that
is, knowledge acquisition from several information sources, seem
to matter most, with some differences between energy efﬁciency
and CO2 abatement, probably depending on the radicalness and
the content of the innovation. Sectoral intensity of energy expendi-
tures is highly correlated to EI, suggesting a cost saving motivation
underlying the innovation activity.
In line with former similar studies, we ﬁnd that current and
future expected regulation is highly correlated to EI. This result
corroborates the importance of well-designed, long-term and
time-consistent policies to promote the development of cleaner
technologies for energy efﬁciency and CO2 abatement (Veugelers,
2012).
For the EU ETS, the empirical evidence provides mixed results
on its role in promoting innovation. In the ﬁrst phase of the scheme,
Italian ETS ﬁrms were associated with a more widespread adoption
of EI in the areas of energy efﬁciency and CO2 abatement. However,
when we focus on the smaller core set of ETS ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that
the policy stringency is negatively related to innovation diffusion,
a result that applies to both types of EI taken into account. Three
possible explanations are proposed. First, the most innovative ﬁrms
might have started improving energy efﬁciency and abating CO2
before the introduction of the EU ETS (which was known about long
in advance), thus conﬁrming the role played by future expected
environmental regulation in affecting innovation decisions, which
emerges from our ﬁndings as well as in the related literature. Sec-
ond, the regulator might increase the policy stringency for the
less innovative sectors (giving them a relatively low amount of
allowances) so as to lead them to increase their innovation efforts.
Third, the negative sign of the relationship between EI and strin-
gency may  be partly due to speciﬁc sector weaknesses, especially
for ceramics and cement ﬁrms. Among the polluting sectors taken
into account, ceramics shows the highest stringency indicator and
the lowest share of ﬁrms adopting EI.
To get a deeper understanding of this issue, we  conducted
interviews with experts, managers, and industry associations.
Interesting insights emerged from this complementary qualita-
tive analysis: all interviewees argued that in Italy the ceramic and
cement sector was particularly slow to react to the introduction of
the emissions scheme, and that during the ﬁrst phase of the EU ETS
most ﬁrms adopted a “wait and see” policy, using the allowances
at their disposal rather than investing in new technologies to take
advantage of the possibility to sell the permits.
Further research will be needed in the future to enhance the
present analysis. In particular, while data constraints limit the time
span of the current study to the ﬁrst EU ETS phase, it would be
important to extend this and investigate whether subsequent more
stringent ETS phases have produced more intense EI adoption. Fur-
ther, new ETS designs might generate more innovation incentives.
This is an urgent issue, since the picture is currently very mixed. We
have witnessed a drastic reduction in allowance prices over recent
years by about 50% since 2010, associated with still high volatil-
ity. This price volatility can generate structural uncertainty about
future developments in the ETS market and provide ambiguous sig-
nals to ﬁrms and sectors. This calls for appropriate amendments to
the ETS which might reduce the price volatility and related uncer-
tainty hindering the adoption of the radical innovations currently
needed to address the environmental challenge. trading to environmental innovation: Evidence from the Italian
/j.respol.2014.10.014
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Table A3
Veriﬁed emissions in the examined EU ETS sectors during the period 2006–2008.
Sector 2006 2007 2008
Coke and reﬁneries 28,185.69 28,912.06 27,681.06
Pig  iron or steel 13,709.98 13,890.76 15,528.64
Ceramics and cement 31,343.17 31,951.32 29,180.71
Pulp, paper and board 5053.85 5007.03 4756.43
Total Emissions under EU ETS 227,439.47 226,405.41 220,676.33
Non EU ETS emissions 346,600 337,600 320,500
Source: Authors’s elaboration on EEA (2013a,b).
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nvironmental innovation and variables used
able A1
ndustry code description.
Industry code Description
10 Manufacture of food products
11 Manufacture of beverages
12 Manufacture of tobacco products
13 Manufacture of textiles
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel
15 Manufacture of leather and related products
16  Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and
cork, except furniture
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
19  Manufacture of coke and reﬁned petroleum products
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and
pharmaceutical preparations
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
23  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
24 Manufacture of basic metals
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except
machinery and equipmen
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical
products
27  Manufacture of electrical equipment
28  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
29  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and
semi-trailers
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
31 Manufacture of forniture
32 Other manufacturing
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
able A2
eaders in EI adoption in the EU among Sweden, Italy, Germany, France and The Netherla
Sectors Leader CO2 innovati
Manufacturing Germany 
Industry (except construction) Germany 
Financial and insurance activities The Netherlands 
Financial service activities, except insurance and pension
funding
France 
Service of the business economy Sweden 
Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except
compulsory social security
Sweden 
Manufacture of basic metals Germany 
Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products,
except machinery and equipment
Germany 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products Germany 
Manufacture of coke and reﬁned petroleum products Germany 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery
and equipment
Germany 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products Germany 
Manufacture of paper and paper products Germany 
Air  transport Germany Question 10. Innovations with environmental beneﬁts
An environmental innovation is a new or signiﬁcantly improved
product (good or service), process, organizational method or mar-
keting method that creates environmental beneﬁts compared to
alternatives.
• The environmental beneﬁts can be the primary objective of the
innovation or the result of other innovation objectives.
• The environmental beneﬁts of an innovation can occur during the
production of a good or service, or during the after sales use of a
good or service by the end user.
During the three years 2006–2008, did your enterprise intro-
duce a product (good or service), process, organisational or
marketing innovation with any of the following
environmental beneﬁts?
Yes No
Environmental beneﬁts from the production of goods or services
within your enterprise
Reduced energy use per unit of output ECOEN
Reduced CO2 ‘footprint’ (total CO2 production) by your enter-
prise ECOCO
Table A1.
Table A2
Table A3 trading to environmental innovation: Evidence from the Italian
/j.respol.2014.10.014
Fig. A1
Fig. A2
nds (source CIS).
on Leader emission
innovation
CO2 innovation ranking
Italy (1–5)
Emission innovation
ranking Italy (1–5)
Germany 5 3
Germany 5 3
France 5 4
France 5 3
France 4 3
The Netherlands 5 3
Germany 5 3
Germany 2 3
Germany 5 5
Germany 3 4
Germany 2 2
Germany 4 5
Germany 5 5
Germany 4 5
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Fig. A1. Source: Authors’ own  elaboration based on Point Carbon (2013) data.
g. A2.
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